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O P I N I O N 
    
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge:  
I.  Introduction 
Sherman Abrams appeals summary judgment on his racial discrimination and First 
Amendment retaliation claims against the Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation 
(PATH) and several of its employees.  He contends that the District Court overlooked 
evidence that PATH‘s basis for terminating him was pretextual and retaliatory.  Because 
Abrams did not offer sufficient evidence to present a triable issue of fact on his claims, 
we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
II.  Background
1
 
PATH is a governmental entity created by an interstate compact between the 
States of New York and New Jersey, with the approval of Congress.  See 42 Stat. 174 
(1921); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1-1 et seq.; N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 6401 et seq..  PATH 
operates a transit rail system connecting New York and New Jersey across the Hudson 
River.  Abrams, an African American, was employed by PATH for thirteen years—from 
February 1992 to August 2005—in a position designated by PATH as ―Trackman I.‖  As 
a Trackman I, Abrams worked on PATH‘s railroad tracks, and his tasks included lifting, 
moving, and placing railroad spikes, ties, and rails.  As a result, PATH required that 
                                                 
1
 Because we write only for the parties, we briefly summarize the undisputed facts, 
drawing all inferences in favor of Abrams, the non-moving party.  See Barefoot Architect, 
Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 826 (3d Cir. 2011).   
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Abrams be able to walk in track areas, climb wall ladders, stand for long periods of time 
(two to three hours), crouch for up to 30 minutes, lift material weighing up to 100 
pounds, and handle heavy equipment weighing 45-90 pounds.   
Throughout Abrams‘s employment he was obese, and from at least 1998 he also 
suffered from chronic cellulitis and phlebitis.  Due to these medical conditions, Abrams 
was absent from work for protracted periods of time:  PATH attendance records indicate 
that he was absent on paid leave for 282 weeks, or almost 5½ of the 13 years he worked 
at PATH.  Over the course of his employment, Abrams also repeatedly complained about 
his treatment at PATH, raising union grievances, filing complaints with the EEOC, and 
bringing unrelated lawsuits against PATH.   
Abrams‘s orthopedist, Dr. Lee, was deposed in one of these lawsuits in January 
2005 and testified that Abrams should not be in a job that required a lot of walking and 
standing or that required walking on uneven surfaces.  After learning of this testimony, 
Paul Moreno, a superintendent at PATH, requested an evaluation of whether Abrams was 
able to perform the duties of a trackman.  Moreno also noted that, since January 1, 2004, 
Abrams had been out sick for 140 days, and that Abrams had given notice that he would 
continue on sick leave until June 2005.   
On March 8, 2005, Dr. Jaffe, an orthopedic surgeon, examined Abrams for PATH.  
Dr. Jaffe diagnosed Abrams with a torn meniscus and concluded that he was able to hold 
―a very sedentary position,‖ but could not perform tasks such as ―walking, climbing 
stairs, and getting up and down from a seated position.‖  Abrams was then evaluated by 
PATH‘s Office of Medical Services (OMS) and Dr. Duke, PATH‘s Chief Medical 
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Officer, reported that Abrams was ―fit for duty as a Trackman with a permanent 
restriction of ‗no lifting over 50 pounds, no squatting, bending or climbing; no prolonged 
standing or walking – not utilized.‘‖  In April 2005, Dr. Lee responded to Dr. Jaffe‘s 
opinion and agreed with him that Abrams should ―avoid excessive stair climbing,‖ and 
―should not walk on uneven surfaces that he does when working as a trackman.‖  But Dr. 
Lee also opined that Abrams ―is fit for duty.  He may return to duty with the restrictions 
of not going back as a trackman.  He can work regular duty on floors that have even 
surfaces if this is available.‖  A week after Dr. Lee‘s report, Dr. Jaffe reported to Dr. 
Duke that he had reviewed the job requirements for a trackman and had concluded ―with 
a high degree of medical certainty‖ that Abrams ―will not be able to perform the full 
duties of a Trackman I.‖  Abrams was then re-evaluated by OMS and Dr. Duke 
concluded that ―he is never fit to perform the duties of Trackman I.‖   
In June 2005, at the request of Abrams‘s union, the Transport Workers Union of 
America (TWU), PATH convened an Employee Review Committee to meet with Abrams 
concerning other job opportunities at PATH.  Abrams expressed interest in each of the 
six alternative positions identified by the Committee but, based on his medical condition, 
Abrams was ―not capable of performing the full duties‖ for any of the positions.  TWU 
and PATH then agreed to convene a Board of Doctors to determine whether Abrams was 
medically disqualified from holding the position of Trackman I.  PATH designated Dr. 
Duke to represent it on the Board and TWU designated Dr. Lee as its representative.  Dr. 
Duke and Dr. Lee were then required to agree on a third doctor to serve on the Board, and 
after exchanging several names, ultimately agreed on Dr. Schob.  Dr. Dukes had 
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proposed Dr. Schob and had certified that he ―is not associated with PATH or me in any 
matter.‖  In September 2005, Dr. Schob examined Abrams, consulted his medical 
records, and provided a detailed medical report, concluding that Abrams was not 
medically fit for the position of Trackman I.  The Board concluded by a 2-1 vote that 
Abrams was not medically fit for the position of Trackman I. 
Two months later, after a number of telephone and in-person contacts from 
Abrams, Dr. Schob admitted that, unbeknownst to Dr. Dukes and Dr. Lee, he had 
performed permanency evaluations on PATH employees through a company called 
Procura.  Dr. Schob then wrote a letter to Dr. Duke in which he explained that he felt ―it 
was necessary to alter my final conclusions with regards to [Abrams‘s] work status‖ and 
that he felt that Abrams ―should be allowed to return to work at his usual and customary 
activities as a Trackman 1.‖  On the basis of this letter, TWU requested that Abrams be 
reinstated.  PATH refused and a Special Board of Adjustment was convened to arbitrate 
their dispute.  The Adjustment Board considered Dr. Schob‘s original and subsequent 
reports and in a thorough, detailed opinion concluded that Abrams‘s claim for 
reinstatement based on Dr. Schob‘s revised opinion was ―without merit.‖   
Abrams then sued PATH and several of its employees in New Jersey state court, 
asserting numerous claims for relief under both federal and New Jersey law.  These 
included two claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that PATH had 
discriminated against Abrams on the basis of his race, in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and retaliated against him for exercising his free speech rights, in violation 
of the First Amendment.  The case was removed to the United States District Court for 
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the District of New Jersey.  The District Court dismissed a number of Abrams‘s claims 
and the parties proceeded with discovery on the remaining claims.   
At the close of discovery, PATH moved for summary judgment, first on Abrams‘s 
Fourteenth Amendment claim and then later on his First Amendment claim.  In separate 
orders, the District Court granted both motions.  With respect to the Fourteenth 
Amendment claim, the court assumed arguendo that Abrams had established a prima 
facie case of discrimination but found that Abrams had not presented sufficient evidence 
that PATH‘s stated reason for terminating him was pretextual.  With respect to Abrams‘s 
First Amendment retaliation claim, the District Court found that Abrams had failed to 
present any evidence that his termination was the result of his protected speech.  The 
court further noted that both of Abrams‘s claims were deficient as to PATH because he 
had not presented any evidence of an unconstitutional policy or custom that would 
support a finding of liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 
(1978).
2
 
III.  Discussion 
We review de novo the District Court‘s grant of summary judgment.  Barefoot 
Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 826 (3d Cir. 2011).  ―While ‗[t]he evidence of the 
non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor‘ 
in determining whether a genuine factual question exists, summary judgment should not 
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 The District Court also granted summary judgment on Abrams‘s Equal 
Protection claim based on disability discrimination.  Abrams does not appeal this ruling. 
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be denied unless there is sufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably find for the 
nonmovant.‖  Id. (citations omitted). 
The District Court properly granted summary judgment on Abrams‘s First 
Amendment retaliation claim against the remaining individual defendants.
3
  Like the 
District Court, we assume arguendo that Abrams‘s complaints about discriminatory 
practices at PATH were protected speech under the First Amendment and consider 
whether he presented evidence that his speech was a ―substantial factor‖ in his 
termination.  See Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 2009).  Abrams argues 
that the District Court overlooked evidence of temporal proximity and a ―pattern of 
antagonism‖ that supported such an inference.  But he has not provided—either before 
the District Court or this Court—any indication of the timing of his protected speech or 
how this speech related to retaliatory action against him, both of which are essential to a 
showing of temporal proximity or pattern of antagonism.  See Abramson v. William 
Paterson College of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 288 (3d Cir. 2001); Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers 
Co., 206 F.3d 271, 281 (3d Cir. 2000). 
Summary judgment was also proper on Abrams‘s Equal Protection claim based on 
alleged racial discrimination.  Abrams first contends that the District Court erred in 
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 Summary judgment was also proper on Abrams‘s Monell claims against PATH.  
As a state agency, PATH can only be held liable under § 1983 for Abrams‘s termination 
if the termination arose from an unconstitutional policy or custom of PATH.  Brown v. 
City of Pittsburgh, 586 F.3d 263, 292 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).  
Abrams contends that Dr. Duke‘s improper selection of Dr. Schob as a ―neutral‖ doctor 
despite Dr. Shob‘s connection to PATH supports an inference that PATH had a policy of 
deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.  This inference is dubious at best, and falls 
well short of the exacting standard applied to a Monell claim based on a single incident.  
See Brown, 386 F.3d at 292-93. 
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finding insufficient evidence of pretext and points to countervailing medical evidence and 
a number of procedural irregularities that in his view show that the PATH employees‘ 
stated basis for terminating him was pretextual.  This evidence, viewed in the light most 
favorable to Abrams, shows at most that the Board of Doctors and the Special Board of 
Adjustment mistakenly determined that he was medically unfit for the position of 
Trackman I.  The evidence does not show that PATH‘s reliance on their determinations 
was so implausible as to be a pretext for racial discrimination.
4
  See Kautz v. Met-Pro 
Corp., 412 F.3d 463, 467 (3d Cir. 2005); Abramson v. William Paterson College of N.J., 
260 F.3d 265, 283 (3d Cir. 2001). 
IV.  Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the grant of summary judgment. 
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 In addition to this evidence, Abrams also points to the letter he wrote to the 
EEOC and testimony from his deposition, both of which identify several white trackmen 
who were not terminated despite medical conditions that he claims are comparable to his.  
However, Abrams acknowledged that he had not seen these employees‘ medical records 
and presented no evidence that these employees‘ had been diagnosed with such 
conditions or that their doctors had stated in written reports and under oath—as his doctor 
had done—that they could not meet certain requirements of the Trackman I position.  
Although ―comparative evidence is often highly probative of discrimination,‖ Anderson 
v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621 F.3d 261, 268-69 (3d Cir. 2010), this evidence is 
insufficient because it does not show that the white employees are similarly situated to 
him, i.e., ―alike in all relevant aspects,‖ Startzell v. City of Philadelphia, 533 F.3d 183, 
203 (3d Cir. 2008). 
